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Abstract 
Objective: (1) To describe and analyze the process of "compacting," or 
moving control of health systems from the Indian Health Service to American 
Indian and Alaska Native (AlAN) tribes, and the stimuli that drove it; (2) To 
evaluate the obstacles and advantages to compacting; (3) To determine 
whether compacting has the capacity to contribute to improved quality of care 
and better health outcomes of AlAN people; (4) To illustrate these processes 
via a preliminary case study of the compacting of the Cherokee Indian Hospital 
of the Eastern Band of the Cherokee Indians, in Cherokee, North Carolina. 
Design: Primary analysis of legislation and other primary source documents 
and in·depth interviews with key informants. 
Source of Study Data: Public documents in the form of legislation, 
regulation, and administrative policies; key informant interviews of health 
policymakers in the Cherokee Indian Hospital conducted by the author 
Findings: Successful compacting requires an intricate, multistage process of 
preparation and high levels of assistance and cooperation. The goal of 
compacting is not accompanied by the level of resources necessary to make 
compacting a straightforward matter of transfer of federal funds to tribes. 
Successful compacting, at present, is probably only possible for wealthier 
tribes with independent revenue streams that can be diverted to tribal health 
system support, such as gaming revenues. 
Conclusions: Tribal health care likely cannot escape the challenges of 
existing in a public·private hybrid that dominate the larger U.S. health care 
system, despite the clear federal treaty obligation to provide for AlAN health. 
Compacting, as an important part of the larger trend to tribal self-governance, 
is the best strategy for improving the quality of care and health outcomes for 
AIANs, since tribes know their members' needs best. Compacting in the 
absence of adequate resources, including money and administrative capacity, is 
likely doomed to failure. With such resources, however, compacting will 
improve the health and health care of AIANs. 
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Overview: historical and political paths to compacting 
I, a sickly child, had no difficulty obtaining the care I needed from the 
Cherokee Indian Hospital in Cherokee, North Carolina; contract health services, 
for example, referred me to a cardiologist when my EKG showed an abnormal 
heart rhythm. During most of my childhood, the hospital was owned and 
operated by the Indian Health Service (IHS). IHS offers health care to 1.4 
million American Indians and Alaskan Natives (AIANs) from 500 federally 
recognized tribes in 35 states.' The Indian Health Service is an agency within 
the Department of Health and Human Services whose goal is to "assure that 
comprehensive, culturally acceptable, personal and pubic health services are 
available and accessible to American Indians and Alaskan Natives". 2 Although I 
received good care from the IHS facility in Cherokee, IHS health services have 
usually suffered from inadequate funding, limited facilities, and workforce 
shortages. In addition, IHS's top·down provision of services to AIANs 
perpetuates a state of affairs that, many argue, does not support tribal 
autonomy or facilitate tribes' capacity to govern their own affairs; nor may it 
be the best way to promote quality of care and good health outcomes for AIANs. 
Currently, tribes are taking more control of IHS programs and facilities. 
The Indian Self· Determination and Education Assistance Act (Public Law 93-638) 
of 1975 allows tribes to manage health programs of their choosing. The Act 
mandated that IHS provide the tribe with assets to support this transition. The 
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Act also gave tribes the power to overhaul health programs to combine services 
or contract with other providers. Many IHS facilities function as managed care 
components of a larger IHS system that includes more than 59,000 hospital 
admissions and 8 million ambulatory care visits each year. 2 At present, as a 
result of the Self-Determination Act, over half of IHS facilities and programs 
are now administered by tribes. 3 
Tribes and the federal government use the term "compacting" when a 
tribe assumes administrative responsibility for a facility previously managed by 
the IHS. Compacting enables a tribe to use IHS appropriations according to the 
needs of that individual community. Tribes can also use revenue from other 
sources (e.g. casinos) under compacting, something that had not been possible 
under the old style of IHS administration. One of this paper's major findings is 
that a significant force pushing the IHS and the tribes toward compacting is 
chronic inadequate funding of IHS by Congress.' 
Other forces driving more tribes to compact include a desire for 
increased self-governance; decreased administrative costs for area 
headquarters' offices and IHS, and therefore more budgeting allocations 
directly to tribes for various programs; and increased quality of care for tribes. 
Compacting also presents potential problems for data collection; the creation 
of a new public-private hybrid health system; and transparent reporting of 
performance measures. This paper examines the compacting of the Cherokee 
Indian Hospital by the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, which took place in 
2003, within the broader context of how compacts will affect the future of the 
Indian Health Service. 
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The Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians 
A brief history of the Removal, citizenship status, and land ownership of 
the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians (EBCI) will provide evidence of the 
difficulties this tribe has endured in its relationship to the state and federal 
governments. This history makes clear the EBCI developed distrust of 
government and desired to become self-governing. 
The EBCI is a tribe located on approximately 56,000 acres, known as the 
Qualla Boundary, in Western North Carolina. 5 Approximately 13,400 people are 
members of the EBCI, and 60 percent of them reside on the reservation." The 
members have descended from the few who defied what is known as the 
"Removal" in 1838 and stayed in the Appalachian mountains that had always 
been their home. 
The Removal is often referred to as the "Trail of Tears" because it 
forced several thousand tribal members to march to Oklahoma. The Removal 
was the result of a treaty that exchanged lands in the West for those in the 
East. The EBCI never agreed to this treaty, and even had support from whites 
who believed the treaty was ridiculous, but the government overruled the 
wishes of tribal members and leadership. Soldiers then forced the tribe at 
gunpoint to leave. Approximately one-quarter of the tribe died during the 
journey, mostly from disease. Those who walked the Trail of Tears established 
the Cherokee Nation in Tahlequah, Oklahoma. Those who remained behind, 
defying the treaty, became the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians. The EBCI 
tribal government, inaugurated in 1870, consists of a Chief and Vice Chief, who 
each serve four·year terms, and twelve council members who serve two· year 
terms. The council members represent the reservation communities of 
Birdtown, Painttown, Wolftown, Yellow Hill, Big Cove, and Snowbird. Elections 
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are by popular vote. I am an enrolled member of this tribe, and grew up on 
the Qualla Boundary. 
The citizenship status of the EBCI created many disputes about what 
relationship the federal government and states had with the tribe, and whether 
tribe members were citizens of the United States. The case of US v. D.L. Boyd 
in 1897 designated EBCI as being under "direct jurisdiction of the federal 
government"5 but the case did not resolve citizenship questions; nor did the 
federal government adequately define the citizenship status of tribal members. 
EBCI members were encouraged to serve in World War I in order to obtain 
citizenship, despite many Native Americans' lack of interest in such foreign 
affairs. 5 
The May 18, 1917 draft should not have applied to AIANs, since state 
and federal governments could not agree that they were citizens. This did not 
prevent many officials from telling tribal members that the draft applied to 
them. A large number of EBCI members served after seeing the many posters 
and flyers encouraging them to demonstrate their patriotism. EBCis were 
relatively complacent about military service compared to other tribes, who 
rioted over the draft. EBCI men may have felt that they had to enroll in the 
draft because Cherokee citizenship in the U.S. was again under consideration 
at this time. After the conclusion of World War I, and after several more 
elections in which EBCI members were targeted by county politicians to exploit 
their voting power, Congress passed the Indian Citizenship Act on June 2, 
1920.5 
Land ownership has been another enduring dispute in Cherokee history, 
and land ownership also affected the citizenship debate. Politicians and even 
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several tribal members wanted allotment, meaning the division of tribal land 
into parcels intended to individualize land ownership for AIANs, even though it 
had proven to be tragic for other tribes. The tribe also tried to complete a 
new roll of members, as a stipulation of an allotment bill of 1924 - a bill that 
caused total confusion. The allotment bill caused EBCI to be removed from 
county property tax lists; the fact that EBCI did not pay property taxes 
infuriated many officials of the county containing the Qualla Boundary, who 
attempted to tax members anyway. At the same time, officials in surrounding 
counties continued to obstruct EBCI's voting rights, despite the Indian 
Citizenship Act. 5 The unceasing dispute between the federal, state, and local 
governments over Native Americans' rights can be considered evidence of 
governments' paternalistic approach to the tribes. The citizenship and land 
ownership struggles make clear that the EBCI faced considerable challenges 
merely to be treated as citizens, much less as individuals capable of, and 
entitled to, self-governance, and the struggles form a backdrop for any analysis 
of the provision of health services to AIANs. 
Health status of the EBCI 
Historically, government physicians who have worked at the Cherokee 
Indian Hospital or who have visited periodically have documented the health 
status of the EBCI. This section presents a summary of the health status of the 
EBCI and the history of alternative healing therapies used by the tribe and ends 
with a brief discussion of the reservation's first tribal hospital. 
In 1914, untreated waste water from the Cherokee Boarding School ran 
straight into the Oconoluftee River. This situation may seem unsanitary, but 
this level of plumbing actually exceeded that of most homes in the area that 
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lacked even outhouses. The absence of a sewage treatment infrastructure in 
the reservation's early years is illustrative of the sources of many tribal health 
problems. 5 
The EBCI, as do many tribes, has a strong history of alternative forms of 
medicine. Several taboos associated with "white" medicine still existed in the 
1920's, after the 1918 influenza pandemic had killed 21 million worldwide, 
including many EBCI members. One belief was that physicians purposely gave 
diseases to AIANs. Traditional medicine flourished amidst beliefs that magic 
and conjuring were better to use for any illness. Most physicians commenting 
on EBCI health in the early part of the twentieth century said that they didn't 
see those AIANs who used traditional medicine unless it was unsuccessful, 
suggesting that some EBCI were willing to try "white medicine", at least when 
traditional methods failed or when death was the only other option. This 
health care discord was built on the enduring conflict between AIANs and 
whites, especially white professionals, who wanted "progress." The AIANs, in 
contrast, wanted to preserve their traditions and be left alone by outsiders who 
wanted to change traditional ways. Many of those outsiders wanted to 
eliminate any practice by conjurers. 5 
Beyond the borders of the Qualla Boundary, American medicine as a 
whole was undergoing a dramatic consolidation, with physicians achieving 
unprecedented levels of autonomy and control over admission to their ranks. 
In the latter decades of the nineteenth century, the American Medical 
Association (AMA) and other entities began virtually recreating medical 
education, establishing something like uniform standards for the first time. 
Entry to medical school, and the medical school curriculum, became more 
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consistent, leading to a more homogeneous group of physicians. Around 1900, 
the medical profession went to war with patent medicine makers to prevent 
them from being able to market their products. In 1905, the AMA created the 
Council on Pharmacy and Chemistry to have the authority to assess the 
effectiveness and safety of drugs. Physicians also felt very confident about 
their profession, after several advances in medicine had been made. The 
bacteria responsible for several deadly diseases had been isolated, vaccines for 
diphtheria and tetanus existed, and new diagnostic tools like the stethoscope 
enabled physicians to increase their ability to accurately diagnose disease. 7 
American allopathic medicine used this combination of strong new 
confidence in what it could accomplish and new authority to control admission 
to its ranks, to pressure other practitioners, or the "sectarian groups" who 
practiced what we would now call alternative forms of medicine that set them 
apart from the medical establishment. 7 Conjurers and healers of the EBCI 
would have been considered "sectarians," and it is not therefore surprising 
that visiting physicians wanted to put an end to their practices, particularly 
given the health problems these white physicians saw on the reservation. 
The EBCI 's most common health problems in the first decade of the 
twentieth century included measles, tuberculosis, malnutrition, and "female 
problems. "5 By 1923, health improvements had already begun to come about. 
Walter 5. Stevens, after conducting a medical inspection, found high 
prevalence only of hookworm, pellagra, and goiter, illnesses that are more 
treatable and have less severe sequelae than do the aforementioned diseases. 
A 24·bed government hospital staffed by one physician, one nurse, and an 
assistant had been operational in Cherokee for years. The physician, Dr. 
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Russell D. Holt, had gained the trust of the EBCI after working there for 26 
years. The hospital admitted 251 patients in 1922-1923 and discharged 250. 
This remarkable apparent hospital mortality rate is somewhat was deceptive, 
since most EBCI members feeling close to death preferred to live out their final 
days at home rather than even go to the hospital, but this first hospital served 
some important EBCI needs. 5 
The federal government decided to close the Cherokee Hospital on June 
30, 1954. The Chief at the time, Osley Bird Saunooke, persuaded officials to 
give him a one-year extension to try to find a "private sponsor-preferably a 
religious denomination," but when the year was up the U.S. Public Health 
Service (PHS) assumed control of the hospital in what the PHS and the EBCI 
thought would be a temporary arrangement. 5 From this time, the Indian Health 
Service became the most important factor affecting Native American health 
care for many years. 
History of the Indian Health Service: the road to compacting 
The Indian Health Service (IHS) offers health care to 1.4 million AIANs 
from 500 federally recognized tribes in 35 states. 1 In order to understand how 
compacting developed, we must understand how the IHS has been the locus of 
interaction between the tribes and the US government for health care delivery. 
As more and more Europeans settlers claimed lands without regard for prior 
tribal territorial claims, and forced movements of Native Americans from their 
ancestral homes, the U.S. Government attempted some amelioration through 
the creation of treaties with the tribes, the enforcement of which the 
government delegated to the U.S. Army. The Army sometimes ignored the 
treaties and often changed tribal borders; nonetheless, the treaties 
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represented the first effort by the federal government to protect Native 
Americans. The treaties retained their legal validity even though they were 
not being upheld. The provision of health care was a part of the treaty 
agreements and the Army was also charged with delivering this care, an 
assignment it often neglected to complete. 8 
The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) was created as a government response 
to the Army's inability or unwillingness to execute treaties but the BIA, like the 
Army, also failed to deliver adequate health services, and its health care 
responsibilities were transferred to the Public Health Service in 1954, which 
responded by creating the Indian Health Service in 1955. The Snyder Act of 
1920 had legislated that Congress would provide a budget and occasional 
monetary support for AIANs, giving the new IHS a legislative foundation for 
appropriation of revenues to implement its responsibilities. 9 Initially, IHS 
funding was almost nonexistent; despite this, the US Public Health Service was 
nonetheless able to provide what was considered quality health care during the 
1920's. 8 This good quality health care meant improving the health status of 
AIANs to the point that they achieved average lifespan and health status equal 
to that of white populations. 
Indian Health Service today 
Many people assume that the IHS is an entitlement program, similar to 
Medicare and Medicaid. This is not the case; health care delivered by the IHS is 
the fulfillment of a federal treaty obligation, and the budget for IHS is 
appropriated as a form of block grant, with Fiscal Year 2005 appropriations of 
three billion dollars. 2 This sum is not enough to meet obligations. The IHS 
perpetually suffers from inadequate funding, impairing its ability to realize its 
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mission. Its current per capita expenditure is $2,100, compared to an average 
per capita expenditure on health care of $5,298 for the U.S. population as a 
whole. 10 The IHS is currently funded to meet only 60 percent of estimated need 
for services. 11 Although IHS does not charge its users for services, it is 
considered a "residual" payer; that is, a user must exhaust all other sources of 
payment, including insurance, before IHS begins to cover health care costs. 12 
Approximately one in five AIANs is covered by Medicaid (17 percent}, compared 
to 5 percent of whites who are Medicaid clients. 13 Approximately half of AIANs 
have employee· based or private insurance, a number much lower than the 83 
percent of whites who have such coverage. Unfortunately, one·third of AIANs 
have no insurance, leaving them virtually entirely dependent on meager IHS 
resources to cover most of the services they receive. 13 Many IHS facilities 
function as managed care components of a larger IHS system that includes 
more than 59,000 hospital admissions and 8 million ambulatory care visits each 
year. 2 
IHS coverage is capitated and, as a result, in the IHS system care is 
often postponed or overlooked. The IHS capitation for contracted services 
must cover everything from simple x·rays or diagnostic tests to specialist visits 
that are not available at the local clinic or hospital. 14 Contract health services 
(CHS) are often difficult to acquire via IHS not just because of insufficient 
funding or geographic remoteness, but because patients must complete a long 
and wearisome process before becoming eligible for CHS. They are required to 
go through every other avenue of available assistance, including Medicaid and 
Medicare, before CHS coverage begins. 11 
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Despite inadequate resources, the IHS has accomplished a great deal in 
decreasing incidence of preventable diseases. AIANs have benefited from 
exceptional declines in infectious disease, infant mortality, homicide, and 
alcohol-related deaths. 8 This progress has not eliminated disparities between 
AIANs and whites and other populations. In the EBCI, complications from 
diabetes are three to six times higher than for the white population of the 
United States. 15 Stroke and heart disease death rates are 25 percent higher for 
North Carolina American Indians than for non-Hispanic whites. 15 All of the IHS 
attempts to raise the health status of AIANs have not yet brought them to a par 
with the larger American population. 
Tribes are making improvements since they have begun to compact, or 
administer their own health care programs, as a part of the larger drive known 
as "self-determination". Health care administrators in specific tribes are using 
their knowledge of the culture to re-design programs and improve facilities. 
This micromanagement may produce better health outcomes than did one large 
organization administering programs for alliHS facilities. On the other hand, 
others believe that self-determination may cause tribes to plunge into a private 
health care market for which they do not have the resources to thrive, and 
because this move toward the private sector will inevitably result in the 
decline of Indian Health Service capacity on many reservations, a failure to 
thrive in the private market may leave tribes with no recourse. 16 
Development of Native American self-governance 
Self-governance legislation succeeded because of the tireless efforts of 
a few leaders in Congress and the IHS who refused to give up on the idea that 
tribes can better decide what is best for their people than can the federal 
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government. Passage of the legislation, however, has by no means ended the 
debate over whether tribes are truly prepared to handle the responsibility. 
During the development of the self·governance legislation, even tribal 
members were unsure of the strength of their appetite for self·governance. 
Self·governance (also known as self-determination) for AIANs is a 
concept that has struggled to exist since federal responsibility for tribal 
services began. Before any settlers arrived in the United States, Native 
American tribes were self-governed; that is, all operated as autonomous 
political systems and were completely self-sufficient. These tribes had been 
sovereign; the introduction of new ways of life forced them to forfeit their 
traditions and customs, and were anathema to tribal self-governance. 17 For 
example, the Dawes Act of 1887 insisted on assimilation, preventing AIANs from 
using their language, dress, or customs, and divided tribal land into pieces for 
each family. This approach to assimilation harmed the unity and connectivity 
of tribes, and health status plummeted and mortality rates rose, as a 
consequence. 18 
Given the strength of the ideology of assimilation, the idea of self-
governance did not re-emerge until the 1950's, but by the 1970's, it was 
encouraged to the point of being forced on tribes, particularly in the 
administration of their health programs. 17 Regaining power and feeling more 
united as a community and tribe is desirable in many ways. However, many 
tribal members and policy-makers question what benefits this new government-
to-government relationship will actually produce. 
The IHS has had its own self-governance struggles. It survives only 
because of the combination of extremely hard work and political skills of key 
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directors, and with the aid of important allies in some presidential 
administrations. Joseph Jorgensen concludes from comments made by several 
congressional members that IHS was created by members of Congress who 
wanted to dismantle the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and demolish Indian 
Programs, ultimately denying AIANs any federal provisions. 19 The biggest 
struggle for the IHS occurred during the 1950's, the era of assimilation, when · 
the Eisenhower Administration endorsed the idea of "termination," or 
terminating federal responsibility for AIANs and acculturating them to become 
typical American citizens. 17 
Eisenhower and many members of Congress believed that termination 
was desirable for AIANs, and that the exchange of lands for the loss of federally 
recognized status was a worthy exchange - an improvement, and the route to 
becoming more "American." At the same time, no one in government wanted 
responsibility for AlAN health- including the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare and the Public Health Service. After all, AIANs were the poorest, 
least educated, and most unhealthy population in the United States. 17 
Native Americans were influenced by their experiences in World War II 
and after, and by the Civil Rights Movement, and began to press for more 
control over tribal matters. Many were tired of government decisions being 
made with no tribal input. 5•16 At the same time, the IHS and the perpetuation 
of a federal obligation to AIANs survived, in part, because Emery Johnson 
became the new Director of IHS in 1969 and supported self-governance; 
President Nixon was also an avid supporter of AlAN rights. "We must make it 
clear that Indians can become independent of federal control without being cut 
off from federal concern and fed~ral support," he said. 16 Dr. Johnson's goal 
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was to place the power of administering health programs in the hands of the 
tribes. His first step in doing this was training and recruiting Community 
Health Representatives (CHR) on the reservations, who were chosen and 
supervised by the tribes themselves. 17 
Tribes were confused by the alternating status of their independence. 
Some had even supported termination during the Eisenhower Administration, 
because they believed anything was better than having the BIA make decisions 
for them, since the BIA had a long-standing record of inadequate health care 
administration. 8 Others were vehemently opposed to termination, because it 
violated the promise of federal obligation in treaties that should never be 
forgotten. Whichever side they took on termination, most Native Americans 
had an intense distrust of the government and the IHS. The distrust is not 
surprising, given the most recent experiences under assimilationist policies. 
Now, people in the government wanted to give them power· an idea that was 
perplexing and seemed too good to be true. Many AIANs distrusted their own 
tribal governments to handle this kind of responsibility, believing politics and 
health care never mix well. Others assumed this new power was embedded in 
a plan designed for tribal failure. 19 
Dr. Johnson truly supported the self-governance of tribes, and with the 
help of his ties to key members of Congress, he was a driver of the passage of 
the Indian Health Care Improvement Act (PL 94-437) in 1976. The Act required 
tribes to determine their specific health care needs and design a 
comprehensive health plan; to the surprise of many, more than 90 percent of 
tribes completed plans. The Act's purpose was raising the health care quality 
and status of Native Americans, but most importantly it was "to encourage the 
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maximum participation of Indians in the planning and management of those 
services". 17 This was a small victory, as it only allowed Native Americans to 
take part in construction of facilities for safe water, waste disposal, and 
limited facility management. 17 
A year before the Indian Health Care Improvement Act became law, the 
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (Public Law 93·638) of 
1975 established tribes' ability to manage health programs of their choosing. 
The act mandated IHS provision of assets to tribes to support this transition. 
The Act also gave tribes the power to overhaul health programs to combine 
services or contract with other providers. Over half of I HS facilities and 
programs are now administered by tribes as a result of these Acts. 3 These two 
pieces of legislation, supporting health care improvement and endorsing self· 
determination, formed the present policy foundation for compacting. 
Compacting: giving substance to self-governance 
Compacts, or the assumption by tribes of the administration of their 
own health service~, are the ultimate goal of self-governance. They allow 
tribes to be completely in control of their health systems and the funding 
associated with them. However, compacting also has potential problems, 
including the use of gambling revenues to supplement the cost of health care 
for a tribe, inadequate data collection and reporting, and the possible inability 
of tribes who are not wealthy to compact. 
Compacts are similar to contracts, but allow more flexible use of IHS 
funds. The direct relationship between the federal government and tribal 
governments cuts administrative costs from intermediary IHS headquarters and 
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area offices. Compacting also allows tribes to tailor federal money to suit the 
specific needs of their tribes. Unlike IHS administration, which does not permit 
the use of outside revenues, compacts authorize tribes to take advantage of 
any monetary resources available. 4 
However, compacts have many extant and potential problems. One 
problem confronts those tribes who do not have other sources of monetary 
support to help them run programs. While many are excited about compacting 
and its preliminary results showing improving health care on reservations, 
others are sure this new relationship will cause the downfall of many tribes 
who do not have gambling revenues to enhance their programs. 4 Everett 
Rhoades, the Director of the IHS from 1981 to 1993, believes "a great 
redistribution or rearrangement is happening, with a shift of resources to the 
compacted (wealthier) tribes", and " ... a possible ultimate outcome of self-
determination and now self-governance will be termination"17 - to the 
detriment of tribes without their own unique revenue sources. 
Self-governance and compacting are means to functional independence. 
Compacted tribes can decide for themselves the pressing issues for their tribes 
and apply the proper resources to resolve these issues. The separation of the 
tribes into many entities, however, also causes a loss of consistent, comparable 
data gathered from similarly administered health programs, and, as with other 
features of compacting, the effects of this loss of health status information will 
cause the poorest tribes to suffer the most. Self-governance may also help the 
federal government move closer to transferring IHS responsibilities to the 
states, via block grants, with the increased risk of termination in many states. 
Only time, and the improvement in leadership and skills in business, will 
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determine whether tribes can survive their own "market-based health 
economy" now thriving in other parts of the US health care system. 
Compacting has fragmented the system of care for AIANs. If the 
government had provided the Indian Health Service with adequate funds from 
the beginning of its existence, the system of AlAN health care delivery context 
would be better and stronger, able to enjoy the benefits of centralization - and 
compacting of health care may not ever have gained momentum; the targets of 
self-governance may have been elsewhere. The federal government, however, 
has never made budgets adequate to meet AlAN health care needs. This has 
forced tribes to abandon some ties to IHS in an attempt to salvage health care 
for their communities. Though IHS provides support for tribes throughout their 
transition into compacts, the ultimate success of these new arrangements will 
depend on the business mentality of tribal leaders. 
Methods 
This research uses a variety of policy analysis techniques, often denoted 
"qualitative," to explore the likely consequences of compacting. In particular, 
I have searched the published literature, analyzed primary public and quasi-
public source documents, including legislation, IHS documents, and tribal 
documents, and have conducted in-depth interviews of tribal policymakers. 
This section concludes with a summary of the legislation that surrounds self-
governance and compacting. 
Searching the literature and locating primary documents 
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I searched several databases including Cochrane, PubMed (MEDLINE), 
and Ebsco in addition to using the "Google" search engine to identify 
documents relevant to my topic. I used the search terms and combinations 
presented in Figure 1 below. 
I eliminated most documents concentrating on specific tribes other than 
the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians. These excluded articles covered a 
variety of the topics discussed here, but since my focus is on compacting with 
particular reference to my tribe, I did not feel that using several documents 
from different tribes in other geographical locations would provide 
generalizability to the EBCI, although such a comparative analysis of 
compacting in other tribes would certainly be a valuable future area for 
research. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of the present work but, in a 
few cases, I have included documents associated with other tribes' compacting 
when the documents provided insight into the development of self-governance, 
compacting, gaming, insurance coverage, or access to care. I also excluded 
documents that did not have legislative or regulatory authority, and documents 
that were created before 1995 in order to include only the most recent 
evidence on compacting and the state of the IHS. I attempted to gather 
information on as many perspectives as possible, and was also interested in 
obtaining an indication of the degree of public discussion surrounding 
compacting. To this end, I have included some editorials. Dr. Anne Bullock, 
Medical Director at Cherokee Indian Hospital, provided the remainder of 
primary documents I have used for this research. The documents she provided 
me were specific to the EBCI during the compacting planning and process. A 
friend provided me with the source on Cherokee history by John Finger. 
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Figure 1. Search terms for locating primary documents 
Compacts AND Native American Gambling revenues AND compacts 
tribes 
Indian Health Service Native American access, quality of 
care 
Self-governance Third-party payments AND tribes 
Self-governance AND tribes Medicare OR Medicaid OR SCHIP AND 
tribes 
Indian gaming Self-determination AND tribes 
Gambling revenues AND tribes Self-determination OR compacts OR 
gaming AND legislation 
Conducting research with members of a sensitive population 
My project involves research on a sensitive population. A sensitive 
population is a group who may have been exploited by researchers in the past, 
and for whom researchers must now take special considerations and steps to 
ensure the protection and integrity of the study population. The EBCI has a 
tribal Institutional Review Board (IRB) that must approve any research 
conducted on the reservation, or research using data from the reservation. 
After tribaliRB approval, the research proposal must go before tribal council. 
The researcher must be present to answer questions the council members have 
about the project, and how the information it produces will be used. Of key 
interest to all tribal parties involved is the assurance that the researcher will 
provide copies of final research products to the tribe. In the past, researchers 
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often failed to give the tribe information about research results after having 
collected data from the tribe. This failure, helped in part to spur the creation 
of the tribaliRB. The whole approval process may take up to three months, as 
tribaliRB and council meetings permit. The present research has passed 
through this process. 
After I received IRB approval from UNC-Chapel Hill, I submitted my IRB 
application to the tribaliRB through Dr. Bullock. I received council approval 
upon my assurance that I would provide the council with a copy of my final 
document. I then conducted three open-ended in-depth interviews. I selected 
the three respondents based on their role in the compacting. I wanted to talk 
with employees who focused on different areas: community, clinical services, 
and overall administration. The three respondents representing those domains, 
respectively, were Jody Adams, Public Relations Officer of the Cherokee Indian 
Hospital Authority; Dr. Ann Bullock, Medical Director, Eastern Band of Cherokee 
Indians Health and Medical Division; and Casey Cooper, CEO of the Cherokee 
Indian Hospital Authority. 
Scientific rigor in qualitative research 
Throughout my data collection I adhered to the principles of qualitative 
research collection as described by King, Keohane, and Verba in "Designing 
Social Inquiry: Scientific inference in Qualitative Research". One of the 
principles is to keep and recount the full data collection process. I have 
described my search terms and how I have gathered all forms of data in an 
attempt to fulfill this principle. Another principle is to use many different 
ways to gather data from several sources, or to gather "observable 
implications". 20 
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This gathering data from several sources is, in essence, the concept 
behind the theory of triangulating research. If data from several different 
sources converge, they validate one another and strengthen the synthesized 
findings to which they contribute. One should also take care to use valid and 
reliable data collection techniques. Figure 1 shows the breadth of the search 
terms I used to uncover primary documents. I used the same interview script 
for each in-depth interview respondent, following established principles of in-
depth interviewing. 21The interview script is presented as an Appendix at the 
end of this paper. 
Even with the most careful use of both methods - analysis of primary 
documents and in-depth interviewing -- we cannot always be certain that we 
have avoided "omitted variable bias". 20 It is possible that my interview 
questions, selection of respondents, or literature search omitted a key "control 
variable" that would affect any cause and effect association I attempted to 
make. 20 By searching broadly rather than narrowly, however, I am less likely to 
have missed a key variable in the causal pathway. 
The data collection process should also be replicable. I believe that this 
presentation of my research methods would enable another researcher to 
replicate my processes and collect the same data, from which he or she could 
draw the same, if not very similar, conclusions. Replicability, however, 
remains the most difficult of the qualitative research principles to assure, as 
many different and unexpected obstacles may prevent someone else from 
having access to the same materials I have used. 20 Also, any other researcher 
would need to be able to interview the same people, which assumes that those 
people would always be available and would answer another researcher's 
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questions in ways substantially similar to their responses to the questions I 
asked. This is a stringent assumption. Nonetheless, if my conclusions are valid, 
and if I have presented my methods clearly enough, a replication of the 
research should produce findings similar to those I have drawn. In fact, I 
welcome additional research on this topic. 
On the following page, Figure 2 presents a summary of critical 
legislative and regulatory developments that set the path on which tribes and 
the IHS walked toward compacting. In the sections to follow, I present an 
analysis of compacting in the EBCI. 
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Figure 2. Chronology of legislation and development of self-governance 
1824 Bureau of Indian Affairs created and located in War Dept. 
1887 Dawes Act forced assimilation of AlANs 
1920 Indian Citizenship Act declares AlANs to be citizens of the 
United States 
1920 Snyder Act appropriates a budget for AlAN health care. 
1949 BlA transferred to Dept of the Interior and charged with 
responsibility for Native health 
1954 Public Health Service assumes responsibility for AlAN health 
care from the BIA 
1955 Indian Health Service created 
1975 Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act 
(lSDEAA), Public Law (PL) 93-638 allows tribes to manage their 
own health programs 
1976 Indian Health Care Improvement Act , PL 94-437 mandates 
that tribes should determine their own needs and encourages 
maximum participation in the management of health care 
1994 Permanent Self-Governance Legislation, PL 1 03-413 
established permanence of self-governance in tribes 
2000 Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 2000, PL : laid out 
the specific tasks and responsibilities of IHS and tribes in 
carrying out self-governance 
• ..J, 7, SOURCES. .. , ·-
23 
The decision to compact 
The following four sections describe and analyze the process of 
compacting specifically for the EBCI. This first section describes why 
compacting was seen by the tribe to be the best option to improve the health 
care system and outlines the steps the tribe took to make this decision. 
The EBCI experienced budgetary shortfalls that had left the tribe on the 
point of making drastic cuts in health services; in the circumstances, they had 
been searching for any alternatives that would change or delay that outcome. 
Compacting was an option that, at a glance, seemed to be favorable. The tribe 
had a casino and other gaming revenue that could provide additional funding, 
and the ability to use tribal shares and provide care specific to EBCI needs were 
very appealing aspects of compacting. Also, as mentioned by Casey Cooper, 
the tribe had been exercising their 638 rights (638 referring to the ISDEAA 
legislation) in the form of a Title I contract and already managed many services 
such as housekeeping and the Community Health Representatives program. He 
estimates they were managing approximately $3 million of the services, and 
had done so for years. Therefore, self·determination was not a completely 
new concept to the tribe. 
Aside from financial issues, several other factors accelerated the tribe's 
perception that it needed a new system of health services delivery. Patient 
satisfaction had declined, staff turnover had increased, better technology was 
needed, and the very health status of the tribe was changing. 24 In particular, 
increases in the incidence of chronic disease clearly required a change in the 
scope of care delivered and resources used to improve chronic disease 
management and strengthen preventive care. 
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Determining feasibility 
The tribe then had to determine whether compacting would be feasible 
in terms of finances, staff, resources, and community and council support. 
They also had to examine what the relevant legislation permits and requires for 
a tribe to compact. 
The governing legislation mandates permits a tribe to compact if it 
meets three criteria: 
• The tribe must demonstrate financial stability over three consecutive 
years. 25 That is, they cannot have a history of any uncorrected 
significant and material audit exceptions in the required annual audit of 
contracts or funding agreements. 
• A tribe must also have completed the planning phase as stated in §137. 
20, which requires budgetary and legal research, as well as internal 
tribal government planning and organizational preparation relating to 
administration of programs. 
• Finally, the tribe must have passed a resolution to compact, and the 
council and Chief must agree to the resolution. 25 
The EBCI first created a core committee charged with determining the 
feasibility of a compact. They had to examine the current system and decide if 
adequate systems were in place to make the transition to a tribally run facility. 
The tribe would be responsible for payroll and would acquire a mountain of 
financial responsibility it had never had before. 
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One of the most difficult tasks was to create five-year forecasts with 
and without compacting as a measure of whether compacting was economically 
desirable. The committee determined that compacting would postpone the 
drastic financial shortfall from 2003 to 2007. One of the ways this financial 
boost would take place is through using tribal shares. Indian Health Service has 
an extensive book that describes the programs, services, functions, and 
activities (PSFAs) the organization provides and oversees for tribes. Each of 
these PSFAs has a dollar amount or "share" attached to it. Though some of the 
PSFAs are inherently Federal and cannot have their shares used for other 
programs, several of the PSFA shares can be controlled by tribes for programs 
of their own choosing. 26 Many of these shares had resided at the headquarters 
level and, upon compacting, would be transferred to the tribe for local 
services. 
Doing research on the available shares as well as the legislation and 
rights under compacting was an extensive process, Casey Cooper explained in 
his interview. The legislation on self-governance is fairly specific on the 
question of what information about IHS and PSFAs is available for tribes to use 
in this research. 25 
Even more beneficial than the general mandate in the legislation is its 
requirement that the IHS as an agency must support self-governance and all 
tribes who wish to participate in it. 22 Ironically, the agency must support a 
concept and actions the effect of which will be to take money away from the 
agency at the national headquarters level. The law requires the I HS to 
encourage self-governance and assist the tribes in gaining self-governing skills 
in a process that will diminish or eliminate the need for many IHS jobs. All 
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respondents noted the awkwardness of this situation. Jody Adams remarked 
about the suspicions present among Cherokee representatives who met with 
IHS employees. She said "sometimes we left thinking that it was just, 'that's 
what they are supposed to say to us'." However, she also said that they (IHS 
employees) were helpful and offered to assist as much as possible. 
Casey Cooper also mentioned that, in particular, the Nashville area 
office is extremely helpful: "The agency lead negotiator is one of the best 
advocates in the nation," he said. This is extremely important, as "there are 
other areas in the nation where there is still a lot of agency resistance to self· 
governance and it makes it very difficult for those tribes, and very 
contentious." Mr. Cooper emphasized how crucial it is to have someone who 
really comprehends self-governance and supports its implementation. 
Certainly, bureaucratic obstructionism has slowed or halted the 
implementation of other policies, and such would be the case with compacting 
if alliHS employees resisted the policy change. 
Apart from the question of IHS resistance to implementation of self· 
governance is the question of the funds available to help tribes prepare to 
compact. Each year a specific amount is available to as many as 50 tribes who 
decide to compact. 25 When large tribes choose to compact, their budgets 
consume a considerable share of the funds, limiting the number of smaller 
tribes who can begin the process. The EBCI is a large tribe, but it is smaller 
than are some others, meaning that it might come out quite well or quite 
poorly in the compacting budget exercise. As Dr. Bullock noted, the Navajo 
tribe was considering a compact at the same time that the EBCI had begun to 
consider compacting. The 2000 census reported 298,215 Navajos in the US, 
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with 173,987 of those members living on the reservation. 27 1f the Navajos, with 
a population about 20 times that of the EBCI, had compacted at the same time 
as did the EBCI, the money available to assist the EBCI would have been 
proportionately much smaller than what they did in fact receive. Section 
1000.52 of the Federal code regulations for self-governance states that tribes 
are awarded advanced planning grants based on need, completeness of the 
grant application, and the percentage of tribal resources comprising the total 
resources covered by the last audit. Section 1000.47 states that these grants 
are not competitive but, if there are insufficient funds, then priority is first 
given to those tribes that have been selected from an applicant pool to 
negotiate a Funding Agreement. 25 So, an element of chance and timing also 
affects a tribe's successful initiation of the compacting process. 
Community support 
The EBCI conducted all of the budgetary and legal research required to 
compact. After determining that compacting the hospital would be the best 
option to improve quality of care and deal with the budgetary shortfall, they 
also wanted to make sure they had community support. Those involved with 
researching the compact addressed both the community and hospital employee 
concerns. All three of my interview respondents named community and 
employee resistance as one of the most important challenges in the compacting 
process. 
To get the community's perspective, Jody Adams and others conducted 
several community group meetings in churches and other locales to educate 
the community about compacting. They asked tribal members what they knew 
about compacting and what their concerns were, and then informed them of 
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what the predictions were for the future of the hospital with and without 
compacting. Casey Cooper said that they also held a " ... series of town hall 
meetings, if you will, where we had televised meetings in the council chambers 
and hired a completely independent moderator to put forth questions that 
were coming from the community and then answer them the best that we 
could." 
Why was the community concerned? A perceived majority felt that 
there was not anything in particular wrong with the existing system of health 
care delivery and therefore wondered why the tribe wanted control of the 
hospital. The biggest concern emerging from the meetings was that a political 
body would be responsible for the functionality of the hospital. Many 
community members did not know what a compact was, and explaining these 
concepts in the appropriate manner was very delicate. Casey Cooper said that 
if compacting is " ... oversimplified it stimulates a lot of unnecessary fears 
and concerns in people." Community members also feared that compacting 
would diminish the responsibility of the federal government for their health 
care. Casey Cooper also stressed that "it was really difficult to get the 
community to understand that self-governance doesn't relieve the government 
and it doesn't eliminate their accountability to those treaty obligations, it just 
provides it in a different method. Rather than providing that accountability or 
paying those treaty debts through service, they're paying it monetarily through 
financial resources, and then the management is up to the local tribe." He 
called the meetings a very open forum of information flow: "there was nothing 
held back, there was nothing hidden, it was really important to just roll it out 
when it was available." 
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Employee unease had a different source. They felt their jobs were on 
the line, and felt that they had much more of a vested interest in what 
happened to the hospital and to their positions. The tribe hired an 
independent facilitator to conduct focus groups with the employees. Their 
anonymity was protected in these meetings, and all responses were recorded 
and collected into a large document distributed to all who were responsible for 
planning the compact. As Casey Cooper noted, this document helped " ... so 
that we could just address [employee concerns] and so they could be assured 
that their concerns were affirmed, that leadership heard them, and then there 
were a lot of conditions applied to the self-governance process to help resolve 
some of their fears." He gives as an example "the federal employees said they 
feared an unfair personnel system, one that wouldn't provide the same level of 
rights they had, rights to due process, rights to appeals. They feared that they 
would lose credit for their services or that their retirement would be in 
jeopardy." The compacting committee then prepared a "whole list of 
recommendations that were endorsed by tribal council to help address each of 
those fears." 
The employee focus groups transcript shows that, indeed, the main 
concerns were political influence and job security. 28 Dr. Bullock understood this 
concern completely. She was recruited in 2000 to be the medical director of 
the Health and Medical Division of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians. She 
had many years of Federal service under her belt. She wanted to remain a 
"Fed", as she puts it, throughout the compact. Casey Cooper granted her wish 
and created an Intergovernmental Personnel Agreement (IPA) for her. The IPA 
allows the employee to work at a non-Federal government institution but 
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retain all of his/her benefits, as the government pays the hospital for that 
employee's salary/benefits. 29 She describes her desire to stay a Federal 
employee as " ... you get enough years toward a pension, and a lot of sick hours 
built up, and you want to keep them." The breadth of federal employees' 
concerns about their federal employment credit and their concern about 
becoming tribal employees led the compacting committee to structure a 
choice: employees could stay in federal employ, enter into a hybrid 
arrangement via devices like the IPA, or become a tribal employee. For those 
with years of Federal service, there is clearly a benefit to staying Federal, as 
described by Dr. Bullock. For others, the excellent benefits package offered to 
tribal employees may be more attractive. The goal of the compacting is to 
increase the number of tribal employees over the years, and that is occurring. 
This goal exists because a compacted tribe is trying to cut ties to the Federal 
government; having more tribal employees supports this transition. 
The EBCI had resources at hand; the histories of compacts in other 
tribes enabled the EBCI to see how these personnel questions had been 
resolved elsewhere. The EBCI obtained statistics from these tribes on 
percentages of employees who decided to stay Federal or switch, and the 
attrition they experienced up to five years after compacting. This information 
also helped the EBCI to reassure employees that indeed this system had been 
accomplished in other places. 
By the time the issue of compacting went before council, everyone was 
well-informed. Council members had been invited to serve on the compacting 
exploration committees, and were well aware of or had participated in 
community meetings. The exploration core committee had thoroughly 
31 
conducted research on all areas of the compact including PSFA shares, core 
competency of hospital employees, financial forecasts, and employee and 
community concerns (as well as how to address them). 30 When resolution 739 
passed, the process of compacting could begin. 
Planning phase 
The planning phase of the compact consisted of demonstrating 
eligibility, showing the tribal resolution, and completing the planning 
requirements. The planning report, according to section 1000.20 of the Code 
of Federal Regulations for self-governance, must describe each of the 
following: 
• The programs the tribe wants to negotiate to include in the compact; 
• Planning activities for the programs; 
• Benefits derived from planning activities; 
• Processes the tribe will use to resolve complaints by service recipients; 
• Organizational planning the tribe has completed in anticipation of 
implementing tribal self-governance; 
• Indications of whether the tribe's planning efforts have revealed that its 
current organization is adequate to assume programs under tribal self-
governance25 
Several hospital committees from various departments met on a regular 
basis to plan how the compact would take place. 31 Casey Cooper became the 
lead negotiator for the EBCI in negotiating what shares the tribe would control. 
The ultimate goal in everyone's planning was to design a system of 
implementation that would cause no break in clinical services. Essentially, if 
the goal were reached, the patients would see no immediate difference in 
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health care delivery on the first day of compacting. Each department 
determined its short· and long·term needs to help determine financial 
estimates for compacting. 32"34 More definitive policies and procedures were 
formed to govern performance and evaluation measures as well as job 
descriptions. Jody Adams and others continued to educate both the community 
and hospital employees about the compacting process. 
Negotiation 
The negotiation phase consisted of developing the proposed compact, 
itemizing the shares the tribe would control, and negotiating with the IHS (and 
BIA) to finalize a Compact and Funding Agreement. 
The annual funding agreement (AFA) as defined by§ 100.81 of the 
governing CFR is a "legally binding and mutually enforceable written 
agreement negotiated and entered into annually between a self-governance 
tribe/consortium and BIA". 25 The AFA specifies the funding that will be 
retained by BIA for Federal programs, those shares that could not be used by 
tribes; the funding that will be transferred to tribes; and the funding to be 
retained by the BIA because the tribe is leaving such funding to BIA 
administration. Residual funds are those necessary to carry out functions only 
BIA employees could do given that all tribes assumed responsibilities for all BIA 
programs the Act opens to tribal assumption. 25 
The two phases of AFA negotiation are the information phase and the 
negotiation phase. The tribe is not required to go through the information 
phase; should it do so, the tribe would have to submit a letter of interest that 
demonstrates interest in negotiating a program to be included in the AFA. The 
letter must also describe several other aspects of the program including a 
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description of the program's cultural or geographical significance to the tribe, 
requests for available program funds, and the technical assistance to be 
provided by the Bureau. The actual negotiation process involves a discussion of 
tribal legal or program concerns and the options for program amounts. 25 
The most difficult part of negotiation for Casey Cooper was determining 
contract support costs. These are the "administrative or the indirect costs 
associated with management." Each tribe must try to estimate how much 
money it will need to cover those contract support costs. If the tribe 
negotiates an amount that turns out to be below what it needs, the tribe will 
not have enough administrative support, or it will have to cut direct care 
services to make up the administrative shortfall. Each year Mr. Cooper 
participates in the revision of the AFA, and reviews the "services we will 
provide, the services that we will buy back from them, and the cost associated 
with each of those." Negotiators also discuss the funding associated with 
different services no matter whether the tribe provides them or they remain a 
government provision. 
One of the main services the EBCI decided to buy back was use of the 
Resource Patient Management System (RPMS), an extensive data collection 
system that integrates clinical and administrative data. Several parts of the 
system are based on the Department of Veteran Affairs (VA) VistA software. 35 
The RPMS contains over 50 integrated software applications, and allows the 
Cherokee Indian Hospital data to be accessed on a national level by IHS. It is 
an expensive data system, and is often not affordable to the smaller tribes that 
compact. As Casey Cooper noted, having the RPMS would not be a high priority 
for tribes with workforce constraints. If, he said, a tribe has " ... access to a 
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family practice doc two days a week and you're trying to get all your enrolled 
members who need visits seen in the two days that he's available, the last 
thing on your mind is all that intensive data collection." 
Implementing the compact 
Implementation refers to the actual transition from IHS administration 
to tribal control of the hospital. The implementation of the compact went 
smoothly for the EBCI in September of 2003. Respondents attribute this 
smooth transition to the excellent preparation and organization of all parties 
involved. Casey Cooper said "as far as the clinical side and the patient care, I 
think it went very smooth." The difficulties in implementation were in the 
functionality of the accounting and finance divisions, departments that had 
been virtually non-existent before, and had to be built almost from the ground 
up. Administrative and support services "had to be developed and had to 
evolve, and as they were evolving there were obvious limitations on the 
system." The clinical services transition was flawless, Cooper said, because 
"there were good systems in place and it was not vulnerable really to the 
attrition or to the change in management because the systems were so 
formalized." 
All three respondents feel that compacting has greatly benefited the 
EBCI. Compacting postponed a drastic budgetary shortfall and freed shares to 
be used to administer programs the tribe needs. The employees can now feel 
more of a sense of ownership of the hospital. Jody Adams noted that before 
compacting the IHS " ... just gave you that pocket of money and they ... dictated 
the services we would provide, they dictated if we could paint a room, if we 
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could remodel...the money came from them, it was really that paternalistic 
type of management ... ". She emphasized that now " ... we ask the community 
what they want and then we try to implement that." Dr. Bullock supported the 
self-governance: " ... 1 believe Indian people can and should, when the 
infrastructure ... is there, when the local expertise is there, when the pieces are 
in place to do it, tribes should do it." 
Respondents also noted the financial benefits of compacting. Tribes 
can use supplemental revenue sources under a compact, and can therefore get 
additional funding from gaming revenue, foundations, and donations. Dr. 
Bullock noted the hospital's ability to acquire aCT scanner and the flexibility 
in how to allocate funding. Because she is deeply involved in diabetes 
programs at a national level, she advocates for the cutting-edge diabetes 
program in Cherokee, including a complete complementary medicine program 
with acupuncture, massage, and yoga. A meditation garden is under 
construction now. 
Though large financial issues loom in the future, the funding that comes 
from smaller grants, donations, and other sources of revenue is being used for 
several changes to the hospital. Jody Adams emphasized the need to assure 
that the hospital has as many culturally appropriate features as possible. She 
said "I want people to know when they walk in the door, when they drive up 
the driveway, that it's a Cherokee Indian Hospital, not just another hospital." 
Current challenges for compacting 
Compacting creates several concerns about data collection, reporting 
requirements, the ability of tribes to function in the private sector, and the use 
of supplemental revenue from gaming. 
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Extensive data collection by compacting tribes can demonstrate the 
degree to which the health system has or has not improved under tribal 
administration, and data collection can provide continuing information useful 
to those seeking ways to close gaps in health care and access between AIANs 
and other groups in society. One question, however, is whether thorough data 
collection requirements interfere with tribal sovereignty. Reporting these data 
is obviously helpful, but to what system of reporting should tribes adhere? 
Compacting tribes are responsible for administering their contract care services 
and negotiating with outside providers, an entry into the private health 
services sector tribes have not taken before. Will tribes unfamiliar with the 
private sector have the resources and skills to negotiate with outside parties? 
Because of the overall structure of the Indian Health Service, tribes are 
increasingly relying on third-party sources of funding. Also, compacting tribes 
must be able to negotiate and contract for services with outside providers. 
The structure of these health systems is now that of a public-private hybrid, 
and whether this structure will be more beneficial than was the old system is 
uncertain. 
Tribes can use gaming revenues to support the cost of their compacted 
health care systems. The EBCI has both a casino and a bingo hall that provide 
revenue for everything from the police department and language retention 
programs to individual tribal members' income. From the time the casino 
doors opened, people have debated whether gaming is a stable or ethically 
appropriate use of funding for a hospital. Employees of the Cherokee Hospital 
were concerned that should the casino close, their hospital would also have to 
close. 28 Many are concerned that gaming revenues gained as a result of the 
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gambling addictions and loss of income from others are not without ethical 
questions as a funding source for a hospital system. 
The next sections explore these challenges in more detail. 
Data collection and reporting requirements 
Sovereignty questions surrounding data collection emerge from the 
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA) of 1975 (PL 
93-638) and its provision allowing tribes to compact with the Government3 at 
the same time that it prevents the Indian Health Service from forcing tribes to 
conduct outcomes or performance measurement. 36 Any reporting, then, is 
required only as a result of what is negotiated in the compacting process after 
the tribe has proven economic feasibility and assumed administration of a 
program. 
According to §137.200 of the Amendments of 2000 to the ISDEAA, each 
compact must have a stipulation that obligates a tribe to report some measure 
of health status and services delivered. 23 However, it is stated clearly that 
these bare data requirements are intended to impose a light burden on tribes, 
and are in no way intended to be used for quality assessment or monitoring. 
Tribes can include their own standards and requirements for data reporting as 
they see fit. This section also states that tribes are never required to report 
any confidential information regarding employee salary or identifying patient 
information. Examples of data reported may include sets of existing 
information such as demographics or workload. Tribes and IHS must agree 
upon reporting requirements no less than 60 days prior to the initiation of 
compacting negotiation. 23 
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The Secretary of DHHS is required to submit a report of the level of 
need being funded, or a lack thereof, for each tribe with compacts. However, 
the Secretary is not allowed to "impose any reporting requirements on 
participating Indian tribes or tribal organizations to complete these 
reports ... ". 23 This report, due no later than January 1" of each year, consists 
mainly of cost·benefit analysis. The report is intended to describe level of 
need and funding according only to budgetary requirements. No mandatory 
report is submitted to the Committee on Indian Affairs of the Senate or the 
Committee on Resources of the House of Representative to detail health 
outcomes or performance. 23 
Tribes are encouraged to take part in the reporting system used by the 
Department of Health and Human Services. This system is set forth by the t--
. 
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993, and GPRA requires 
that IHS uses these standards in its own reporting. GPRA requires submission of 
an annual performance plan, report, and a strategic plan that lists goals and 
how they will be achieved by the program over the next five years. The annual 
performance plan enables the organization to form both an appropriate set of 
performance indicators and the associated funding needed meet those goals. 
However, the issue of designating these goals is tightly bound to political 
influence and is associated with the amount of funding Congress appropriates. 
Proposing to meet an unrealistic set of performance indicators may cause a 
program to lose funding. Presenting goals of reaching very minimal indicators 
could cause Congress to decrease funding. Therefore, the GPRA standards are 
not necessarily that easy to adopt. IHS has implemented these standards 
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because GPRA places "the same planning and evaluation processes that good 
public health programs have used for years". 37 
For an organized federal bureaucracy like the IHS, using GPRA standards 
is fairly convenient. The centralized data collection system allows IHS to meet 
GPRA standards regularly. Tribes would have a great deal more difficulty 
collecting these data in these ways. Tribes are not required to provide GPRA 
data, but several do so as a way of demonstrating their willingness to be 
accountable for what the tribe has done. Of Tribally Operated Health 
Programs (TOHPs), or programs operating under compacts, 68 percent report 
GPRA standards (the three criteria described in addition to seventeen 
performance indicators), which represents 85 percent of the total population of 
TOHP patients. Many tribal leaders have used the system to educate 
themselves about how funding operates on a public health scale. 37 The 
Cherokee Indian Hospital Authority adheres to GPRA standards, and it may be 
easier for them to do this because they retained the RPMS computer data 
collection system discussed on p.27 above. 
The federal bureaucracy believes that GPRA is the best way for tribes to 
report performance and, thus, the Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 2000 
include a stipulation that IHS will provide any support needed for a tribe to 
adopt data collecting procedures to report these performance measurements. 
These resources include software, hardware, technical assistance, training, and 
costs of reporting. 23 As I have noted, legislative mandates prevent extensive 
required reporting, in order to avoid violating tribal sovereignty, but consistent 
data collection and reporting do have potential quality, effectiveness, and 
economic benefits for tribal health programs. IHS encouragement and support 
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of tribal use of GPRA procedures is a way of helping tribes who wish to report 
do so. 
Requiring a program to be accredited through either the Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) or the 
Accreditation Association of Ambulatory Health Care, Inc. (AAAHC) is another 
means of ensuring that a compacted tribe is meeting performance indicators. 
Requiring accreditation must be agreed upon in the negotiation of the compact 
between the tribe and the Federal Government. At this point, 54 percent of 
TOHPs are accredited; this percentage represents 77 percent of total health 
program users. 36 There are no data on what percentage of these accredited 
programs also provide GPRA data but, increasingly, public and private entities 
are trying to harmonize quality and outcomes data collection, and this is likely 
to be the case with tribal reporting as well over time. Of note, there is no 
penalty for failing to become accredited. Despite the requirement for 
accreditation in some compacts, PL 93·638 prohibits any recourse being taken 
against tribes that do not meet negotiated performance measures unless there 
is "imminent endangerment of the public health caused by an act or omission 
of the Indian tribe ... " or "gross mismanagement with respect to funds 
transferred to a tribe by a compact ... " (Section 507 25 USC 458aaa-6). 23 The 
Cherokee Indian Hospital Authority most recently achieved their JCAHO 
accreditation in 2006. 
Tribes have several options for reporting performance measures. This 
decentralization of data collection makes it difficult to compare program 
information, or draw an overall evaluation, from different compacted tribes. 
Program evaluation would benefit from agreement by the compacting tribes to 
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use a single reporting system, accompanied by the resources to do it. For 
example, the IHS could choose accreditation to be the means through which all 
tribes would report performance data. With one preferred system available, 
fewer tribes would face reporting confusion, and more could go through the 
accreditation process with the assistance of I HS. Or, perhaps I HS should 
encourage all compacting tribes to become accredited AND comply with GPRA 
standards. This option seems less feasible given the budget shortfalls I HS 
already experiences. 
The goals of the compacted programs are to provide comprehensive and 
culturally competent care that is accessible to the population. Determining 
whether goals are met inherently involves performance measurement of some 
kind. Tribal leaders, during the negotiation phases, may not get enough 
assistance and education about what reporting requirements to institute in 
their compacts. How is reporting the data helping those tribes who do submit 
to GPRA standards? In a report evaluating the effectiveness of TOHPs, tribes 
wanted the IHS to do more with the data, suggesting that resistance to 
reporting comes, at least in part, from a belief that nothing will be done with 
the data. Although IHS conducts conference calls with tribes to discuss results 
of data analysis and develop competitive grants, tribes only receive this 
support if they ask for it. 36 We have no data on the typical response time for 
I HS to contact a tribe who has asked for assistance. However, Jody Adams did 
mention that "sometimes it was hard to get the help, but the offer was there 
and I think that was always helpful." Tribes should be informed of the 
purpose of data collection and involved in the results and uses of reporting. 
Tribes should also be fully aware of the ramifications of reporting, i.e., that 
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they will not be penalized for any results of performance measurements, but 
that the results can be used by the tribe in many ways. 
IHS has a goal of collecting reporting data on 90 percent of the 
population served by TOHPs by 2008. The general evidence from those tribes 
who report extensive data show that TOHPs are better at providing a wider 
range of services suited to a tribe's specific needs than was the old system. 36 
The collection of data on access, patient satisfaction, and quality of care is 
essential to demonstrating the effectiveness of a program. Unfortunately, 
none of the reporting systems address the collection of patient satisfaction 
data in a way that addresses the cultural needs specific to tribal populations. 
Tribal sovereignty represents the rights of tribes to have the power to 
make decisions regarding the health and safety of their citizens. Tribes should 
be able to govern themselves and preserve their cultures through organized 
bodies of persons who ensure a protected reservation on which to exercise this 
self-determination. 38 We do not as yet know why remaining compacted tribes 
do not attempt to be accredited or use GPRA measures; we do not know the 
degree to which tribal leaders feel reporting requirements violate their 
sovereignty. Since some tribes have very minimal reporting requirements, and 
all tribes negotiate what reporting they will participate in, it is unlikely they 
feel that their sovereignty is in jeopardy from more thorough reporting, but IHS 
will need to use resources to determine why all tribes do not participate in 
rigorous performance measurement. Once tribes are educated on the benefits 
of data collection and reporting, they will better understand why both are 
necessary and can be done without violating sovereignty. With the greatest 
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understanding of and desire for reporting, however, tribes without the 
resources to measure performance cannot do it. 
The public-private hybrid 
The budget for IHS continues to fall short of providing adequate care for 
all AIANs. As a result of inadequate funding, facilities and programs must 
accept more payments from third-party sources. Also, tribes are increasingly 
depending on Medicaid, State Children's Health Insurance Plan (SCHIP), and 
various forms of private insurance. The combination of inadequate funding, 
more third-party payments, and higher insurance use has culminated in a 
transition of IHS from a purely public program to a public-private hybrid 
(indeed, more closely mirroring the larger American health care system). 
Another reason for this shift is increased demand for a broader range of IHS 
services. Especially with many tribes contracting or compacting to administer 
their own health programs, Indian Health Service is playing a smaller role each 
year in the overall assistance to these programs. Several changes in the 
current health system need to be made to accommodate these shifts within IHS. 
One of the simplest and most effective ways to ensure health care coverage of 
AIANs is through changes to Medicaid and SCHIP. 
The current state of insurance coverage. Unfortunately, though IHS 
does increase access to care for those AIANs who are in close proximity to an 
IHS facility, just under half of low-income, uninsured AIANs have access to 
these facilities. These low-income persons also have lower rates of private 
coverage. AIANs in general have lower rates of employer coverage and higher 
rates of public coverage than is true of the population as a whole. The overall 
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uninsurance rate for AIANs is 35 percent, three times the 12 percent rate for 
whites. 39 In absolute numbers, AIANs are a small percentage of Medicaid 
recipients; they make up 0. 9 percent of all Medicaid recipients, and their 
services account for only 0.6 percent of Medicaid expenditures. 12 But 
proportionately speaking, AIANs, with lower incomes, are more likely to be 
eligible for Medicaid coverage. Approximately one in five AIANs is covered by 
Medicaid (17 percent), compared to 5 percent of whites who are Medicaid 
clients; in absolute numbers. Extensive literature tells us that those with 
insurance have better overall health and health outcomes than do those 
without health insurance. 13 
Third-party payments and the need for services. Casey Cooper 
noted that, because IHS is funded at only 60 percent of need, many tribes are 
attempting to cover the 40 percent shortfall through third-party 
reimbursement. Because these tribes have such " ... a high percentage of 
patients with no payer source, ... you really don't make up the shortfall through 
third-party reimbursement. Fifty to 60 percent of your visits are non-
reimbursable." Nonetheless, tribes will have to continue to seek third-party 
sources of revenue. Several factors inexorably drive the shift to the private 
sector. 
First, originally, IHS facilities were built and equipped to provide acute 
care without any long-term or inpatient capabilities. AIANs now expect tribes 
and IHS facilities to provide all types of care, especially preventive services. 
When the facilities do not have the resources or equipment to provide these 
types of care, they either contract with other providers who can offer those 
services, or look for alternative funding sources to enable them to do so. 
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Tribes who administer their own programs run into unique problems in 
attempting to provide services their tribes need. Providers who agree to 
provide contract care through IHS or tribal facilities have to complete a 
substantial amount of additional paperwork. This is an added burden on the 
already extremely busy clinician, and leads fewer physicians to be willing to 
contract with tribes. Some self-governing tribes are concerned that shifting 
more responsibility to them will somehow lessen federal responsibility. As I 
have noted, as tribes gain more administrative power, some AIANs worry that 
this is the federal government's way of slowly phasing out its obligation to 
provide quality health care for them. Others support the increasing role tribes 
have in designating health care because this role represents tribal sovereignty 
and self-governance. Extensive legislation in place prevents the federal 
government from relinquishing its responsibility to AIANs, but this may not 
eliminate the tribes' challenge of finding and contracting for new services. 40 
Medicaid. Medicaid insurance covers children, pregnant women, the 
disabled, elderly, and those who have limited income. AIANs' high rate of 
poverty is what makes so many of them eligible for Medicaid. This is not a 
desirable situation, but with no other source of assistance for many of these 
people, Medicaid is the only option for coverage. 41 Medicaid is a federal-state 
hybrid, making its recipients in any given state vulnerable to that state's cuts 
or changes to service, potentially meaning that AlAN Medicaid recipients may 
not receive the uniform benefits that the federal obligation to provide AlAN 
care would seem to require. Several protective measures could be 
implemented to ensure Medicaid coverage for AIANs that is not subject to 
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state-designated changes. These measures would result in a small overall 
effect in the total budget of Medicaid and would guarantee the Federal trust 
responsibility to AIANs. 
Unfortunately, Congress is calling for several cuts in Medicaid that, if 
they are passed, will total $11 billion dollars in savings over the next five 
years. 42 In the past year, every state has adopted one or more strategies to 
contain costs. These range from decreased eligibility or benefits, to cuts in 
services offered. This allows states to spend less, but also causes them to lose 
Federal funds usually appropriated to them through the Federal Medical 
Assistance Percentage (FMAP). 41 The average percentage of Medicaid paid by 
the federal government per state is between 50 and 83 percent. For services 
provided to AIANs, this percentage is 1 00 percent, because care for this 
population is strictly a federal responsibility. However, as states make 
reductions to contain costs, these cuts nonetheless affect AIANs, because 
services that a state withholds from everyone on Medicaid are also withheld 
from that state's AlAN population. 42 To eliminate this possible failure of the 
obligation to provide care, AIANs should be exempt from any kind of state 
reductions in either eligibility or benefits. 
Moreover, the 1 00 percent federal coverage of Medicaid services applies 
only to services that are provided directly to AIANs through IHS facilities. 
Referral or contract services are not presently covered by federal Medicaid 
reimbursement. Full federal Medicaid coverage needs to be extended to both 
referral and contract services. This extension, coupled with the exemption 
from service cuts, would still miss those AIANs who get care from a non-IHS 
provider and are not provided any contract or referral care, but it would 
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increase the provision of care to the rest of the population a great deal. 41 Many 
states exempt AIANs from having to pay premiums, deductibles, co-payments, 
or cost sharing. 42 These should apply to all AIANs in all states. These changes 
would not generally affect state budgets. 
Many AIANs are also concerned that cost containment for Medicaid will 
cause services to be cut for AIANs, who make up such a small part of 
expenditure for Medicaid overall. They fear they will be forgotten and subject 
to large losses compared to those endured by the rest of the population. 42 
These fears may originate from the history of AIANs being overlooked in 
national government and health policy matters. Countless examples 
throughout history of political authorities making decisions regarding AlAN 
citizenship and rights without allowing AIANs to express their views on the 
matters fuel this distrust. Until recently, decisions about AlAN health care 
were made without their input. 
Lack of awareness also affects implementation of the Medicaid changes 
for AIANs. Many of the commission members who make Medicaid policy 
changes do not know about Indian programs or the trust responsibility the 
Federal Government has to AIANs. 42 Part of the advantage of IHS programs is 
that the system was built specifically to serve AIANs. All staff who work with 
these programs should be educated about the special relationship between 
tribal governments and the federal government, and how this relationship 
affects health care and insurance coverage. Such education is not necessarily 
extended to Medicaid staffers. 
Another important component of education and increasing awareness is 
consideration of the cultural needs and beliefs of a population. AIANs may 
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have different views of long-term care of family members than does the larger 
population, for example. The individualiHS facilities have done very well with 
forming programs specific to tribes, by providing specific education for family 
members in how to provide long-term care for family members that suits their 
cultural beliefs. Also, the approach to mental health is often viewed very 
differently by tribes than the general population. Many tribes believe certain 
mental illnesses are not illnesses at all, or that the treatment should consist 
more of tribal practices and treatments than medication. A new 
conglomeration of programs entitled "Circle of Care" now has sixteen locations 
and provides behavioral health care appropriate to tribes.'2 
Future changes in health insurance policy. What is being done to 
broaden the current extent of insurance coverage? The Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS) is the Federal agency that oversees Medicare, 
Medicaid, and SCHIP. In 2003, CMS contracted for a Tribal Technical Advisory 
Group to acknowledge the sovereignty of tribes by consulting with them 
regarding any possible changes in policy for these programs. 42 The group is 
made up of 15 members of different tribes who are elected leaders from 12 
Area Offices of IHS as well as representatives of National AlAN organizations. 
The CMS is currently creating a "formal consultation policy" .'3 
This advisory group will be able to provide input from an AlAN 
perspective; its goals are to make the changes, some of which are described 
above, to ensure consistent coverage of AIANs. It is important that the federal 
responsibility continue by means of Medicaid and SCHIP, because of the 
substantial number of AIANs who are in the low-income group. Medicaid 
supplies approximately 20 percent of the IHS budget, but less than 0.5 percent 
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of Medicaid's budget is spent on AlAN health and services. 42 Since services for 
Medicaid provided to AIANs only account for a minuscule amount of the total 
Medicaid budget, it is unlikely that implementing the new recommendations 
would significantly affect the budget. 12 
The shift of IHS into the private sector results from several factors that 
originate in the paths taken by the U.S. health care system as a whole. The 
advancement of services and rising emphasis on preventive services leave the 
Indian Health Service constantly striving not only to catch up to the quality of 
health care in the rest of the U.S., but to make sure this care is provided to 
everyone who is eligible. Increasing the third-party payments is necessary to 
provide services not offered in IHS facilities. All AIANs are relying more on 
insurance to supplement what IHS cannot pay due to budget shortfalls. Until 
Congress appropriates amounts sufficient for I HS to provide services to all 
AIANs, making changes to Medicaid and SCHIP to accommodate a high 
percentage of AIANs is a small and incremental, but feasible step in improving 
care for this population. 
Gaming revenues 
Gaming revenues contribute a significant amount of funding to health 
systems of tribes across the nation. However, revenue-sharing by states 
endangers the future of this funding stream. The National Indian Gaming 
Association, created in 1985 as a not-for-profit organization made up of 168 
tribes, had as their mission to "protect and preserve the general welfare of 
tribes striving for self-sufficiency through gaming enterprises in Indian 
Country".44 The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1998 (25 USC 2701-21) 
permitted tribes to form compacts with states to build and operate casinos. 
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During the first decade of gambling the revenues increased from $212 million 
to $7 billion. Today, approximately 200 tribes operate over 320 gaming 
enterprises; the annual revenues from these facilities total $14 billion.45 
The Cherokee Harrah's casino opened in 1997, and has over 3,000 
employees. The five·year·old gambling agreement between the EBCI and the 
state of North Carolina mandates that the tribe provide $5 million per year in 
gaming revenues to foundations that are not related to gambling economic 
development.46 For example, the tribe has used this money to help fund the 
Cherokee Preservation Foundation and Cherokee Historical Association for 
programs to preserve Cherokee heritage and culture. Also, Harrah's donated 
$1.2 million to the Cherokee Hospital to purchase aCT scanner and upgrade 
some of their systems. 47 This scanner will save approximately half of a million 
dollars in referral services. 
The casino has provided not only funding for the hospital and many 
other services on the reservation, but has created huge employment 
opportunities that not only increase the economic status of many tribal 
members, but increase the employee health coverage these members have. 
The casino provides many health care benefits to tribal members. 
Those who are concerned about the use of gambling revenues to support 
the hospital often, ironically, cite moral arguments from white Protestant 
religious perspectives as reason for disdain of the revenues. Others are 
concerned that, if the hospital is primarily dependent on gaming revenues, 
casino closure would mean hospital closure. It seems virtually impossible that 
the casino will close in the future, given constant growth and expansion of the 
casino and associated hotels and persistent talk of bringing in live gaming to 
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the casino. 46 However, the hospital's significant dependence on a single 
funding source is a legitimate concern. Although such dependence on gaming 
may not be desirable, however, no other option to obtain this level of funding 
exists, and the fact that the funding goes to provide better services and 
facilities to tribal members overrides the fact that it originates from gambling 
in the minds of many. 
Perhaps a more significant but less obvious concern is states' increasing 
and possibly illegal revenue-sharing of reservation gaming revenue. Revenue· 
sharing refers to states' placement of mandates in gaming compacts demanding 
that tribes must donate a certain share of their revenue to the state, in what 
may be a clear contravention of the IGRA, §11, which declares that states 
cannot force tribes to provide a donation to the state or decline to participate 
in compact negotiation because a tribe will not provide such a donation. 48 
Such "donations," nonetheless, are occurring, and President Bush has allowed 
revenue-sharing up to 25 percent in several states since 2001. Casinos across 
the US had $18 billion in revenue in 2004. Of this, $1.8 billion went to states, 
and $100 million went to local governments.'9 States are constantly disputing 
the IGRA in an attempt to gain more control over regulating gaming and 
revenue-sharing. 
The revenue-sharing is what could really endanger the future of health 
care systems that rely on this funding. As governors who are desperate for 
state funding demand more revenue-sharing, tribes lose more of the revenue 
they depended on not only to provide health care, but to improve the quality 
of care. The future of casinos or bingo facilities is probably secure; what is not 
so certain is that tribes will be able to keep the lion's share of the revenues 
52 
they generate, as states are likely to see gaming revenues as an increasingly 
attractive way of funding their own budgets without raising taxes. State 
revenue-sharing is the real threat to the use of gaming revenues to support 
AlAN health care. Only a reiteration of the federal legislation's ban on state-
mandated "donations" can prevent tribes from continuing to lose significant 
amounts of gaming revenues that might otherwise go to improve health care. 
Conclusion 
Compacting has allowed tribes to lay claim to the self-governance they 
were denied for many years. Tribes know what is best for their communities, 
and if they can acquire the skills necessary to run their own health facilities, 
they should do so. 
The policies that have mandated the existence of self-governance were 
meant to increase the independence of tribes. This self-governance should 
allow tribes to separate themselves from the paternalism of the federal 
government and Indian Health Service. Kunitz, however, argues that the initial 
policies paradoxically increased the dependence of AIANs on federal assistance, 
rather than increasing their independence. Native Americans, he contended, 
had the ability to run their own programs, but were being forced to negotiate 
with private physicians, for which they were unprepared, and for which they 
did not have the money. 16 At the same time that tribes were bearing the higher 
costs of health care and other challenges of contracting with private physicians, 
IHS was continually suffering budget cuts. President Clinton attempted to 
assist tribes by adding an extra $125 million to the Fiscal Year 1995 budget for 
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IHS, but this amount only decreased the budget cut from 13 percent to 6 
percent. 16 In other words, the worthy goal of compacting is not necessarily 
accompanied by a transfer of federal funds at a level that would make the 
goals reachable. 
It is clear that tribes would be unrealistic to expect improvement in the 
future levels of funding provided to Indian Health Service. The trend over time 
has not been one of trying to provide vast amounts of more funding to IHS to 
improve Native health care, and the current economic climate is one of cuts to 
domestic programs rather than increases. Tribes, thus, have no choice but to 
find and use supplemental revenues from any source they can identify. The 
problems Kunitz identified a decade ago are still problems for tribes -
especially poorer tribes - who wish to compact. Legislation mandates the 
provision of training and education for tribes to be able to do those very things 
he mentions, such as negotiating with providers, and it is noteworthy that 
tribes have accomplished as much as they have, despite not being provided the 
resources they need in many cases. Tribes have gained the skills they need to 
implement the administration of their own health care systems. When tribes 
fail, the fault may lie with the failure of the IHS to provide adequate 
preparation and assistance. Cherokee represents an example of what to do 
given a supportive area office with employees who support self-governance. 
We should not be aiming for the success of a few tribes. We should 
have a system in place that spreads revenues from the wealthier tribes to those 
tribes in remote locations with no hope of supplemental income. Soon, with 
the dwindling IHS funds, tribes will be competing for money. 16 Money will first 
go to tribes with contracts or compacts, and those who are poorer will not 
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improve. The IHS needs to serve as a system unlike what has been 
demonstrated in the United States. The AlAN population should not become a 
divided society with a large proportion of uninsured citizens who cannot obtain 
quality health care. A proportionate or per capita distribution of gambling 
revenues and IHS funding to all tribes is one way to ensure the survival of 
health care for all Native Americans. This division of funds, should revenue-
sharing not make this impossible, would help those poor tribes compact 
successfully. Self-governance should not be an option only for wealthy tribes. 
The Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians has been successful in compacting 
the hospital. They had excellent preparation for adhering to legislative 
requirements to compact, and for extensive community education. They also 
hired outside consultants to assist in monitoring the progress of committees 
and in conducting focus groups to assess concerns of hospital employees. All 
of these actions supported the ability of the tribe to convey to the community 
a sincere desire to improve health care and to facilitate the tribe's progress. 
The EBCI, however, may be an exception to the rule of compacting. This tribe 
is not only one of the largest in the nation, but does have supplemental 
revenue through gambling. Not many other tribes have the resources available 
to the EBCI when they tried to compact. The goal for all tribes and the IHS 
should be successful compacting for every tribe. 
The Cherokee Indian Hospital participates in a national data collection 
system, and periodically tracks performance measures within their own system. 
Contributing their data to a national system that monitors the progress in 
eliminating health disparities for Native Americans is extremely important. As 
Casey Cooper noted, however, obligating tribes to participate in this data 
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collection is not always feasible. Smaller tribes with less money and workforce 
to dedicate to extensive data collection simply cannot do it. It is therefore 
acceptable to require a less stringent reporting and data collection system for 
these smaller tribes. However, is it too much to ask for even these smaller 
tribes to adhere to JCAHO or GPRA standards? I believe it is not, although their 
ability to become accredited depends on the support they will in fact receive 
from IHS. The real question, then, lies in how much assistance these tribes are 
really provided by Indian Health Service. 
The Indian Health Service is clearly undergoing a major transformation. 
It was a centralized bureaucracy controlling the programs, services, functions 
and activities that took place in almost every tribe across the nation. Now, IHS 
has not only lost control over half of those tribes and the programs they 
provide, but it must reduce its own workforce in order to provide more money 
to tribes. Even though this elimination of administrative costs supports the 
self-governance and success of individual tribes, it must be difficult for IHS and 
its employees to support legislation and programs that truncate its own scope 
and mission. However, that is exactly what IHS must do if tribes are to be able 
to compact. And it seems that for the most part, the employees of IHS are 
fulfilling this duty, as illustrated by the civil servants in the Nashville office 
who worked with the EBCI, and the administrators in Washington. All my 
respondents noted the support of the national and area headquarters' offices in 
promoting the compact of Cherokee. This support is exactly what will be 
necessary for other tribes to be successful. 
How will tribes achieve quality health care for all of their members 
when Indian Health Service continues to have inadequate support from the 
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government? According to Casey Cooper, "real success for Indian health 
systems is for local tribes to really take ownership over these systems ... to 
really take a sense of community ownership over them and to support them so 
that they become not only the provider of choice for your tribes and your local 
communities, they also become the investment of choice for the tribes and 
local community". 
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Appendix: Interview Script 
Thank you again for agreeing to speak with me about the Cherokee Indian 
Hospital Compacting. Because I respect your time, I'd like to go ahead and get 
started. 
First, What role have you played in the compacting of the hospital? That is, I 
would like to know what you did, and how you did it. 
Second, How would you describe the process of compacting? I'm interested in 
anything you want to tell me - how would you characterize this process? 
Third, I'd like to know about the challenges and obstacles you faced. What 
parts went better, and what parts were more difficult to get through? How did 
you handle the challenges and obstacles that you faced? 
Fourth, Do you feel that compacting has benefited the patients and employees 
of the hospital? What have those benefits been? What about drawbacks for 
patients? Employees? 
Fifth, How would you describe IHS involvement in the process? What about 
now? How would you describe IHS involvement now? 
I just have one last question. Would you tell me about your future goals for 
the hospital? Could you tell me your specific ideas for things that you think 
would most improve the care the hospital delivers? 
Thank you so much! I will be sending you a transcript of this interview, and 
will ask you for one brief follow· up meeting for any clarification or further 
questions. 
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